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Can 
I N T E R N A T  I 0 N A L 
be made 
relevant again? 
- BY JAMES C. HATHAWAY 
Tlzefollowi~zg essay is based on a sinzilar 
dic~lssioiz that appeared in World Ref~~gee 
Survey 1996 (O 1996 U.S. Comnzitteejor 
Refugees). Publication is by permission. 
International refugee law rarely determines 
how governments respond to involuntary 
migration. States pay l ip service to the 
imporlance of honoring the right to seek 
asylum, but i n  practice devote significant 
resources to keep refugees away from their 
borders' *lthough the advocacy community 
invokes formal protection principles, i t  
knows that governments are unlikely l ive 
up to these supposedly minimum standards. 
The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) shows similar 
ambivalence about the value of refugee law. 
It insists that refugees must always be able 
to access dignified protection, even as it 
gives tacit support to national and 
intergovernmental initiatives that undermine 
this principle. So long as there is 
equivocation about the real authority of 
refugee law, states will 
feel free to treat refugees as they wish, and 
even to engage in  the outright denial of 
responsibility toward them. 
Ironic though i t  may seem, I believe that the 
present breakdown in  the authority of 
international refugee law is attributable to 
its failure explicitly to accommodate the 
reasonable preoccupations of governments 
in  the countries to which refugees flee. 
International refugee law is part of a system 
of state self-regulation. It wi l l  therefore be 
respected only to the extent that receiving 
states believe that i t  fairly reconciles 
humanitarian objectives to their national 
interests. In  contrast, refugee law arbitrarily 
assigns full legal responsibility for 
protection to whatever state asylum-seekers 
are able to reach. It is a peremptory regime. 
Apart from the right to exclude serious 
criminals and Persons who Pose a security 
risk, the duty to avoid the return of any and 
al l  refugees who arrive at a state's frontier 
takes no account of the potential impact of 
refugee flows on the receiving state. This 
apparent disregard for their interests has 
provided states with a pretext to avoid 
international legal obligations altogether. 
The Demise of Interest-Convergence 
Much o l ~ h e  debale during the dralting ol 
the Refugee Conven~ion [of 19511 was devoled 
to how best to protect the nalional sell-inieres~ 
d receiving stales The Convention grants staLe:. 
wide-ranging aulhorii)~ io deny relugee stalus 10 
criminals and persons perceived to endanger 
national security Perhaps mosl lundarnenially, 
there was agreemen1 111ai internalional relugee 
12, aiould not impose a duty on slates pelma- 
nently to admit all refugees who arrive at the~r 
borders. Instead, refugees are lo be alforded 
prolectlon against r.cfo~ilcn~ent. States are 
required only to avold returning refugees to an 
ongoing risk of persecution. If and when the 
nsk of serious harm ends, so too does refugee 
stat~ls. In this sense, refugee law is clearly based 
upon a theory ol iemporary prolectlon. 
The absence ol a duly to grant pelmanent 
residence to refugees was cri~ical o the success- 
ful negotiation of the Convenlion. Wh~le willing 
to protect refugees against return to persecu- 
11011, states demanded the nght ultimately to 
decide which, if any, refugees would be allowed 
to reset~le m thelr ternto~ies. While [he refugee 
flows ol post-war Europe were fel~ to be Iog-lstl- 
cally and politically ~mpossible to stop, the lor- 
ma1 distinction between refugee status and per- 
manenl residence reassured siales that the~r so1~- 
ereign authority over immigration would be 
Desp~te this legal prerogative to adm~t 
refugees only as telnporaqi residents, many 
developed states in~tially believed their domestic 
inlerests would be sewed by granting perma- 
nent resldent status to relugees. Because 
relugees seeking proleclion in the years follow- 
lng the Second World War were of European 
stock, their cultural assi~nilation was perceived 
as relat'vel~ stralghifolward Refugees 
helped to meet acme post-war labor shortages. 
The reception of relugees opposed to 
Communist reg-lmes moreover reinforced ihe 
ideolng-lcal and strategic objectives of the capi- 
[ahst world. This peniasive interest-convergence 
belween refugees and the governments of 
industrialized states resul~ed in a pattern ol gen- 
erous adm~ssion policies. 
The reasons that induced this openness io 
the arnval of refugees have, however, largely 
withered away Most who jeek enL1?r Lo 
developed staies today are lrom the poorer 
countries of the South: [heir "different" racial 
and social profile 1s seen as a challenge to the 
cultural cohesion of many developed slates. The 
economies of industrialized slates no longer 
require substantla1 and indiscriminate infusions 
ol labor. Nor is there ideological or slrategic 
value In the admission of most I-efugees. To [he. 
coixrary, governmenu more often view ref~lgee 
proteclion as an irritant LO political and eco- 
noinic relations will1 the slate of origin. 
In these circumstances, il 1s not sui-prising 
that govenlmenls have rejecied the log~c of con- 
llsual rules ol imrn~gration conl.rol. S~ales have 
ncti, ho\ve\ler, responded by revel-ling lo [he 
~ ~ [ u z e e  Convenlionk duly to admil relugees 
I o~~~)~;cmpora~-lly Suc z a pohcy shl i~ was 1210 
po,ccl Ihy No~uial~, but  he governrnenis of rnosl 
,,lhcl ~udusiriallzed counlnes have lnsiiiuted 
lcluporaly prolection only on a siiuation-specii- 
LC bas~s. 
This resistailce io l.realjng lcinporary protec- 
lioll ni [he noini 1s partly explained by deeply 
mgnu~?ecl policy preierences in ~1.aditional coun- 
111~s 01- immigralio~n, such as the Un~tecl Sva~es, 
1 ~jnada, and iiustl,lha Any allernpl to cnd [he I low routme lmkage between reiugee Llauus and 
1 pe1111a11eii~ les~dence In llzese slales ~vould 
1 ;, auue lu~~darncnlal rnelzd~nen~s lo doineslrc 
1 lm;rugrallon legsla~loiz bu~lt up dun~zg [lie era 
oi openness to Cold War ~riugees \Vhile 
I Eu~opean govclnmenti have hs~onsally been 
I res~deizts, ~lley ale concei,ied w t h  cnsunng thal 
Lcml2orai-y protection ol ~ e f ~ ~ g e c s  can lruly be 
biought to an end When la~ge scale gueslworl\- 
€1 plogiams closed down in tlze 1970s, [here 
I ivele still nearly 12 rn~llion 'ten~porary' iesl- dents li\rmg In \Vestem Eulope The guestrvork- 
I ers' soc~al and veisonal auachments lo thelr 
host slates made dcportat~on a pohtlcally unre- 
allstic optlon, Corc~~ig govelnlnents ulornatel)~ to 
allon7 them to remam European policjmalte~s 
\\wry thal a generalized Lemporaly proteciion 
system ior reiugees would similarly be no more 
11lan "a slow way of saying yes" to pennanenl 
admissiolz. 
The vlab~li~y of temporav protecllon as a 
\\lay of reconciling the needs ol relugees lo  he 
lrailonal inlerests of rece~ring slales has no[, 
however, been seliously explored lo dale. This 
is because goveinlnents of the incluslr~alized 
\\~orld have new options lo PI-even1 reiugee 
11 flows from challe~&ng their sovereign aulhoiity 
ovcr immigr-allon. S ~ a l u  now believe  hat 
tech~iologies of border control can prevent most - 
i asylum-seekers l1.on1 ever reaching tlzeir 
i teiiilories. The), also see promise in the kind ol 
I ~n-count17 in~el-\ienlioiz uudei-~alten m Iraq and 
/ Bosnia, which prevented u~oulcl-be refugees 
81 horn even leaving [heir o\m skates, 111 sum, I go\iernnlenls tocla)i see iiillc reason to accepl I [he co~iipromises ~nlzereiil in llze Relugee Coi~veiz~ion. Since legal duties lo refugees arise 
only once refugees successfully access a slate's 
i jurisdiction, why 1101 slnzply kccp relugees at 
1 amzs-lenglh? Wliy depend on in~e~-ma~io~~al  
/ In\,v's temporary proteelion regime in s a l e p ~ r d  
souerelgz a~~~hoi-ity over imnzigralion IS il is 
possrble simply to p~-e\lent llle arrival ol 
rclugees in the l~rsl place? Go~~evnmenls 
lllcreas~ngly deal wiih relugees on a harsh ancl 
) ~~nregula~ed hasis because hey  see inlernationnl 
/ relugee lawk mechanisin LO reco~zcile stale 
Inleresls to relugee inlerests as an anachl-o~zism. 
Politics of N~u-Entrke 
Iiistead ol einbracing rhe Relugee 
Conveniion's solutron oi iempoi-ary proteelion, 
[he response of developed slales to [he end of 
llze inlerest-convergence between I-elugees and 
receiving sLales has been lo avoicl 1-eceivi~zg 
claiins to refugee slatus aliogethei-. Mosl 
Norllieni stales have implemenl.ed non-eniree 
mechanisms, including visa requlrerneizLs on ~lze 
nal~onals ol refugee-pl-oducing slates, cainer 
sanctions, burden-shifliizg arrangements, and 
even [he Corcible ~ n ~ e r d i c l i o ~ ~  of 1-elugees at Sron- 
~ i e ~ s  and ill ln~emalional waters. The s~mple 
pu~pose ol noiz-eniree slrategies is io k e p  
relugees mvi~yfronl 11s 
Non-c~itrte is an explicable, il reprehensible, 
response lo  lie breakdo~m of [he social and 
polllical condilions illat previously led induslri- 
alized stales to ass~milale relugees. Seeing no 
need to accepl the risks assumed to lollow firom 
a generalized lemporaiy proteciioii system, 
stales have laken the more b~utal (yet less !mi- 
I~le) step ol keeping refugees as far away as pos- 
srble lroin tlzeir territories. 
The "Right to Remain" 
Northern go\wnments have I-ecenlly extend- 
ed their pi-opl-rylactic program by clzanzpioning 
the refugee's "riglit to remain" in his or her own 
slate. The "iiglzl to remain" Is supedicially 
attractive. Af~er all, dze besl soluuon to ihe 
reiugee problem is ob~iousljr to eraclica~e ihe 
harms that produce the need LO escape. It 1s 
such a seductive notion that even ilze UNHCR 
has joined 1n the call lor a 1-edefinition oi 
refugee proiection to locus on mha~ die Repoi~ 
of tlze United Nauons I-liglz Conzmission for 
Refugees (1995) called "prepai-edlicss, preven- 
lion and solutions." 
In reahly, however, no inlemational commil- 
nzen~ exisls lo deliver dependable in~eniention 
to aitacli [he root causes of 1-efugee flona, clearly 
a co~zdi~ion precedenl lo the exercise oi any 
ge~zuine vlghi lo remain. Theie is no credible 
evidence [hat intei\7en~ioiz nil1 ever e\iol\.e inlo 
more than a discl-eiiona~;\i 1-csponse to the 
nzi~zorii~l oi refugee-generating situations tlzai is 
of direc~ concer-n 10 po\\~erlul states. The inter- 
veniions 11-1 both Iraqi I<urdis~an and i11 ~ l le  lor- 
nier Yugosla\1ra were responses Lo die clear ~is l i  
ol rehgee llows [oivalcl tl~e dc~~cloped wol-Id. Ivlost 
pern~ciouslj~, these lrvo examples of inieiv-enlion 
to enloi-ce tlze "rigl-tt LO remain" suggest that this 
so-called "rigli~" is csselzlially a i~ieails to i-atio- 
~~al ize d nying al-~isli persons 11112 opiion io flee. 
Each UN m~e~n~enlion \\)as ineslricably lied to 
border closures ~lial eft 110 147ajr lor ~x7ould-be 
relugees io access meani~zglul safety abt-oacl. 
I Relegation of Burdens to the South 
Thrs blu~zl assault by the L\loi-th on reSugee 
in~gi-alion has I-einiorcecl the conhnernent ol 
mosl of the worlds refugees to their I-egons of 
origin ill the Sou~lz. Alrica shelters inore than 
double [he number ol refugees protected 111 all 
of Europe, North America, and Oceania corn- 
bined. The Ivory Coast alone protects nearly 
twce as rnany relugees as al-e presently in [he 
Unlted States oi Anzerica. 111 desperately poor 
counlries like Jordan, Djil~out~, Guinea, 
Lebanon, and Annenia, the ralio ol relugee 
pop~~lalion lo total population is about 1 : l O .  Vet 
refugee law establishes 110 burden-sl~allllg 
~nechariism to offset tlze elzorrnous conil?bu- 
tions made by ~i-rese receplion states of the 
South. 
Some degree ol solidarily is achieved by 
"good oflices," UNIHCR assistance, nd I~oc 
regmes sucl-r as [.he Comprelzeiimre Plan oi 
Ac~iou lor Indochinue Refugees, and tlze like, 
Bui because these eflorrs are orchestra.led out- 
side intemalional relugee law, m tlze realm of 
d~scretion or voluntarisn-r, there are few g~1aii111- 
tecs of meanillgiul suppol? for the states of the 
South. \?/it11 asslstance il-om the developed 
n~ol-ld normally provided afier the fact and on a 
situation-specil~c basis, Southern governments 
are increasingly turning away from tradiliom or 
hosp~tahtji toward refugees. Wlde h e y  normal- 
ly lack [he resources and sophisticated border 
control systems used by the Nortlz to enioi-ce 
~~oll-elzti-ie, the goveminents ol less developed 
countnes have coerced ref~lgees to retuln LO 
their countnes of orign Some also engage in 
absolutei~i blunt denials of access, such as [lie 
decision by Zaii-e simply to close its border to 
Rwandan relugees. 
Principles for a Mew Bamdigm 
of Refugee Protection 
International refugee lawi un~lateral imposi- 
Lion of absoluie responsbility on the asylilni 
skate 1s no1 problen~atic is, as durlng tlie posi- 
wlr era, there is a peinrasive m~er-es~-conlcr- 
geizce 11etween reiugee and Iiost populations. 
Absent suclz a natural sysnrneuy ho\vever, 
reluge? law can function only IC tlzere is a mecli- 
anism in place lo mitigaie h e  bui-dens ol receii7- 
irig stales. The plight ol Taizania - laced ~ v ~ t l l  
massive. immediate. ancl poientially deslabill=- 
i~ ig  refugee flows h-om R\\randa and Gul-undi - 
raises starlily the absurdi~y of a relugee protec- 
tloiz regime in nihlch obhgatioizs XI-c no[ ailjust- 
ed lo take account ol crrcumstances in staies ol 
destiuation. While less pi-okound. the pelrzeivcd 
impact of r e l ~ ~ g w  flo\.\is on societies iri indusi~i- 
alized counlnes ough~ also lo be iac~orccl inio 
~ h c  pmlcction equation Rciusal 10 balance i l ~ e  
claims of rel~lgees LVI\~I [hose of receiving staies 
siiilply iizviles 2 conlinua~ion of present irelids 
to\\inrd c11 bloc denials oi access. 
The time is right to focus on presenlng the 
essence of international refugee law as a system 
for the protection of persons whose basic 
human rights are at risk in their own state, until 
and unless it is possible for them to return in 
safety and dignity A reformulation of the mech- 
anisms of refugee law should be dedicated to 
securing this fundamental goal, taking into 
acco~int he real circumstances of an increasing- 
ly self-interested world. Four basic principles 
are suggested to govern this transition. 
First, refugee protection should not be 
bartered away as pan of the current upsurge of 
interest in addressing the "root causes" of invol- 
untary migration. While intervention may or 
may not evolve as a more practical and globally 
accessible answer to human rights abuse, 
refugees ought not to be guinea pigs in that 
ex-enment. Until and unless there is a depend- 
able response to the risk of human rights abuse, 
the autonomous right to seek protection outside 
the frontiers of one's own state should not be 
compromised. 
Second, we should be open to the 
enhanced flexjbility that a robust system of 
solution-oriented, temporary protection could 
provide. To be attractive to states, temporary 
protection wll  need to be constructed with a 
strong emphasis on preparation for return. 
Return itself will be a realistic option only if 
supported by an empowering process of repatri- 
ation and development assistance. So con- 
ceived, temporary protection could regularly 
regenerate the asylum capacity of host states. 
To advocate the value of temporary protec- 
tion is not to argue that immigration is bad: it is 
simply not the same as refugee protection. 
While the admission of outsiders to permanent 
residence in a state may be a matter of legti- 
mate debate for each country's body politic, the 
basic protective role of refugee protection 
should not be a captive in that debate. Simply 
put, the human rights function of refugee law 
does not require a routine linkage between 
refugee status and immigration. If the protec- 
tion of refugees is both durable and respectful 
of human dignity it need not be permanent. 
Dignified temporary protection is not simply a 
matter of meeting the minimum standards set 
by international human rights instruments, but 
rather requires full respect for the needs and 
reasonable aspirations of refugees. It must also 
be finite. It  would not be reasonable to allow a 
"temporary" protection regme to force refugees 
to wait indefinitely before being allowed to 
rebuild their lives for the long-term. If it  incor- 
porates these critical safeguards, temporary pro- 
tection can be a meaningful response to invol- 
I 
untary migration. 
Third, we ought to dispense with the 
Refugee Convention's unnecessarily rigd defini- 
tion of state responsibilities. Beyond a common 
duty to provide first asylum, there is no reason 
to espect every state to play an identical refugee 
protection role. Some states will be willing to 
provide temporary protection, but not be dis- 
posed to the permanent integration of refugees. 
Traditional immigration countries could readily 
serve as sites of permanent resettlement for 
those refugees whose countries remain unsafe at 
the end of the period of temporary protection. 
Still other states will be in a position to admit 
special needs cases that should be diverted from 
the temporary protection system. There will 
also be governments that assume a  mi^ of these 
roles, or which provide major financial or logs- 
tical support to the refugee protection system. A 
renewed international refugee law based on this 
kind of common but differentiated responsibili- 
ty toward refugees would provide a pnncipled 
yet flexible framework within which to recon- 
cile the needs of refugees to the legitimate con- 
cerns of states. 
Some will argue that a shift to equitable, 
open-textured obligations would weaken inter- 
national refugee law. This criticism does not 
take into account, however, that the practical 
value of formal refugee law has been decimated 
by policies of non-cntrke and the containment of 
refugees in their country of orign. I believe that 
it is morally irresponsible to insist on the sancti- 
ty of traditional legal standards that we know 
do not in fact constrain the self-interested con- 
duct of states. If the international protection of 
refugees is to be meaningfully regulated, then 
we must temper the demands of moral criticali- 
ty to meet the constraints of practical feasibility 
International law is, after all, a consensual sys- 
tem of authority among states. If states are not 
convinced that their interests are taken into 
account by international refugee law, then in 
practice - despite whatever formal standards 
are proclaimed - international law will not 
govern the way refugees are treated. 
FOUI?~ and finally, the institutions of inter- 
national refugee protection need to be retooled 
to promote and coordinate a process of collec- 
tivized responsibility UNHCR's recent efforts to 
prove its relevance to governments have, regret- 
tably, lent credibility to the politics of non-entree 
and to the containment of refugees. UNHCR 
should instead focus on the development of 
dependable mechanisms equitably to share-out 
responsibility for the protection of refugees 
among states. By proposing the standards and 
mechanisms to implement common but differ- 
entiated responsibility toward refugees, UNHCR 
could prove that international law is still an 
effective framework within which to manage 
involuntary migration. 
Critical Thinking is Required Now 
Refugee law serves fewer and fewer peopl, 
less and less well, as time goes on. Refugee In 
as traditionally conceived is being undermint, 
by a combination of non-cntrtc tactics and 
disingenuous insistence of the "right to remai 
We should seize the moment actively to 
promote a new paradigm of refugee protectio 
that is both human rights-based and pragmal 
Refugee law should be redesigned to take 
account of the legtimate state preoccupation: 
that have undermined the value of law in 
governing refugee protection, but without 
compromising the essential commitment to 
protection. 
A renewed model of intemational refugee 
law, built on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility, would allow mot 
good to be done for more refugees than is 
possible under the present regme. The small 
minority of refugees that presently finds solid 
protection in developed states may see a 
reduction of its relative privileges under such 
system, but a reduction in the Cadillacs of th~ 
few could, I believe, provide bicycles for the 
many It is time to reconcile the need for a 
secure and dignified refugee protection syster 
to the legtimate interests of the countries in 
which refugees are sheltered. Refugee law so 
conceived would regain its relevance. 
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